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An Empirical Analysis  of a Marketing
Order Referendum  for  a
Specialty  Crop
Bobby  Mixon,  Steven  C. Turner, and Terence  J. Centner
Specialty crop producers'  marketing problems, associated with lack of quality
standards and advertising revenues, may detract from  profitability. Although
marketing orders, approved  by producer referenda,  offer a means to address these
problems, institutional  rules can make ratification  difficult.  In this study, economic
structure was found to be more important than producer characteristics  in explaining
voter behavior in a Georgia Vidalia  onions marketing  order referendum.
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Marketing orders for fruits and vegetables have
existed  since  the  1930s  with  approximately
15%  of vegetables  and more than half of the
fruits and tree nuts produced in 1981 marketed
under  orders  (U.S.  Department  of Agricul-
ture). A marketing order usually is established
to address  a marketing,  production,  or pro-
motion problem faced by producers and han-
dlers in a particular industry  for a given geo-
graphical area.  Some potential benefits  are to
(a) expand demand, (b) coordinate  marketing
activities  through  matching  supply  with  de-
mand,  (c)  lengthen  the  marketing  season  to
prevent an oversupply and resulting depressed
prices, (d) enhance research and promotion ac-
tivities, and (e) provide quality, grade, and la-
beling standards (Heifner et al.).
Little research  has examined  producer  be-
havior toward the enactment  of a  marketing
order.  Halligan  empirically  examined  voting
behavior of hops producers in a  1965  federal
marketing referendum  and  found that oppo-
sition to the  marketing order  increased  with
grower size. The institution of a marketing or-
der constitutes a voluntary change by produc-
ers  who  are  influenced  by  various  economic
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and individual  factors.  The  objective  of this
article  is  to  analyze  factors  hypothesized  to
affect  the  voting  behavior  of specialty  crop
producers toward approval of a marketing or-
der.
Most research concerning  marketing orders
has  analyzed  the  effectiveness  of  orders  in
achieving  a  stated  objective  such  as  orderly
marketing or price enhancement.  This is often
done by contrasting  a product covered  by an
order with marketing absent an order (Shafer;
Price). Empirical analysis of a marketing order
vote by producers and handlers is uncommon,
although  several  studies  have  confirmed  the
benefits of marketing orders. Hoos (1957) and
Jamison concluded that orders can be effective
in counteracting  cyclically depressed demand
and in cutting  price  troughs  relative  to  price
peaks. Hoos (1962) and Jesse estimated a pos-
itive relationship  between  minimum  quality
standards and demand for some commodities
marketed  under  orders  because  of increased
consumer satisfaction for a quality product. A
study by  Pritchard of a marketing  order for
raisins  concluded  that  the  order  stabilized
prices relative to preorder periods.
More  recently, Berck and Perloff presented
a dynamic model of how owners of profit-max-
imizing farms would vote to allocate a product
between different  markets. They assumed the
government instituted a marketing order. Cave
and Salant also investigated agricultural mar-
keting boards in order to understand the be-
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havior of administrative  committees author-
ized to restrict volume (cartels). In an unrelated
study, Lee and Tkachyk analyzed congression-
al voting on farm legislation to identify influ-
ential factors.  Except  for Halligan, there have
been no studies analyzing factors that influence
producer voting behavior on a marketing order
referendum.
Vidalia onions,  a specialty crop in Georgia,
provided the opportunity to look at an indus-
try that could  possibly benefit by adopting  a
marketing order.  Southeast Georgia  is known
for  a  mild,  sweet-tasting,  high-quality  onion
called  the  Vidalia  for  which  consumers  are
willing to pay a price premium (Centner, Tur-
ner,  and Bryan).  These  onions  are  marketed
only in May and June, since storage to lengthen
the marketing  season has not been  feasible.
Vidalia  growers  faced  two  primary  prob-
lems.  First,  onions  produced  outside  of the
Vidalia  production  area  (several  Georgia
counties) were marketed as Vidalias and were
infringing  on the Vidalia name.  This fraudu-
lent competition added to the second problem,
legitimate competition from sweet onions pro-
duced in other states. The combined result was
a decrease in the Vidalia price premium at the
farm level  (Centner,  Turner,  and Bryan).
The Vidalia onion industry may be adverse-
ly affected by onions marketed as Vidalias that
are grown outside of the production area and
not of comparable quality and taste to Vidalia
onions. The  mislabeling of onions was  docu-
mented in 1985 when the State Commissioner
of  Agriculture  was  successful  in  litigation
against a wholesaler who rebagged onions pur-
chased out of state and sold them as Vidalias
(Irvin v. Scott Farms, Inc.). As a response to
this  marketing  practice,  Georgia  adopted  in
1986 the Vidalia Onion Act which established
regulations,  definitions,  and  a  primary  pro-
duction area. These operate to preclude misuse
of the name "Vidalia  Onions"  in the State of
Georgia, give authority for the Commissioner
of Agriculture to prescribe  Rules of the Geor-
gia Department of Agriculture  for Vidalia on-
ions,  and provide provisions  for the  enforce-
ment of its regulations (Official Code of Georgia
Annotated). Although the law provides for en-
forcement in Georgia, it does not preclude per-
sons residing outside of Georgia  from  selling
onions  as Vidalias  that are  not from the Vi-
dalia production area.
In a  move to  increase  cooperation  among
growers  and address some  of the above  con-
cerns  in the industry,  a state marketing order
was proposed in  1987. The scope of the state
marketing  order  for  Vidalia  onions  covered
research,  promotion,  education,  and  unfair
trade practices. It was to be financed by a pro-
ducer  assessment  and levy of not more than
7¢ per 50-pounds equivalent of all Vidalia on-
ions sold. For a state marketing  order involv-
ing standards  to be enacted,  51%  of growers
representing  at least  51%  of production  vol-
ume must vote in favor of the order (Official
Code of Georgia Annotated). In  1987 a refer-
endum  for a  Vidalia  onion  marketing  order
was not approved. Data  from the state refer-
endum were  used to identify factors  hypoth-
esized to influence producer voting behavior.
Data Source  and Description
Data were  obtained  from two  sources within
the Georgia Department  of Agriculture.  One
was the registration form of each  packer and
grower of Vidalia  onions. The  other was  the
grower's ballot from the 1987 referendum. Data
were collected on each grower's voting behav-
ior, acreage  devoted to Vidalia onion produc-
tion, county of operation,  and type of opera-
tion. Type included two categories, one denoted
growers  who  did  not  perform  any  packing
function  while the other denoted  growers in-
volved in packing activities.
Table  1 shows the degree of grower partic-
ipation  in  the marketing  order  election.  Al-
though  261  Vidalia  onion participants  were
registered,  18 were packers only and could not
vote under Georgia  law. Of the 243 potential
voters, only 47% (115) voted in the marketing
order referendum.  Voting  was  by mail  with
ballots received for 30 days. Thus, the explicit
cost of voting was low. Sixty-four percent (74)
voted for adoption of the order, and 36% (41)
voted against the order. If the 115 voting grow-
ers had all voted in favor of the order, it still
would not have been adopted since enactment
required that  51%  (122)  of the total number
of producers vote affirmatively.
Another notable feature about the voting be-
havior of growers  in the referendum  was  the
fact that the percentage  of voting growers was
lower in the two  counties  accounting  for the
major production of  this product. Toombs and
Tatnall Counties accounted  for 63%  (153)  of
the registered growers. About 56%  of growers
in these two counties did not vote, but of those
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Table  1.  Vidalia  Onion  Growers' Participa-
tion in State Marketing Order
Regis-  Growers
tered  Who
Item  Number  Growers  Voted
.....................  /  %.....................
Voted  in referendum  115  47.3
Did not vote  128  52.7  -
N=  243
Voted for order  74  30.5  64.3
Voted against order  41  16.8  35.7
N=  115
who voted, 58%  supported adoption of the or-
der.
The Models  and Hypotheses
The  voting  decision  was  hypothesized  to  be
influenced  by  the characteristics  of the  indi-
vidual (Si) and the external economic situation
addressed  by  the alternatives  (Xi). For pur-
poses of this analysis,  the vector Si was rep-
resented by two  variables:  (a) the number  of
acres  devoted  to  onion  production,  and  (b)
whether the producer was involved in packing
activities.  The  vector  Xj  was  represented  by
two economic structure variables. The first had
to do with supply and was the total number of
producers  in the producer's  county.  The sec-
ond economic structure variable related to the
competitiveness of demand and was the num-
ber of packers in the producer's county.  Reg-
istration and referendum data from 227 grow-
ers were used for this analysis.
Two models were  developed to try to help
explain the voting patterns in the referendum.
The models  were associated with the two de-
cisions that confronted Vidalia onion produc-
ers who were eligible to participate in the mar-
keting order referendum.  The first decision was
whether to vote, while the second decision in-
volved a positive or negative response. If these
two decisions  were independent,  then  single-
equation probit methods could be used to ana-
lyze each decision.
The general probit form for the ith producer
was
Ii =  f(TYPE,  ACS,  TOTGROW, PACK),
where I was the hypothetical index associated
with the probit specification (Judge et al.). The
first model attempted to explain the vote-not
vote  decision,  while  the  second  model  at-
tempted to explain the vote for or against the
order.  In both, the independent (explanatory)
variables were categorized by individual char-
acteristics  or economic structure.  These vari-
ables were hypothesized to influence the max-
imizing  behavior  of individual  voters which
was  reflected  in  their  voting  behavior.  Two
individual characteristic variables were type of
producer (TYPE) and acres (ACS) of registered
onion production.  TYPE was measured as zero
if the producer was  a grower only and  one if
he/she  was  a  grower and  a  packer.  The  two
economic  structure variables were PACK and
TOTGROW. PACK was defined as the num-
ber of packers  in the  producer's  county  and
could  be viewed  as a proxy  for the competi-
tiveness of local demand. TOTGRO Wwas the
number of registered growers in a county and
proxied the competitiveness  of local  supply.
The  dependent  variables  were  VOTE1  and
VOTE2.  VOTE1  was  a zero  if the producer
did not vote and one if he/she  did. Likewise,
VOTE2 was assigned a zero if the voting pro-
ducer voted "no"  and a one for a "yes"  vote.
TYPE was hypothesized to have a negative
impact on VOTE  1 and VOTE2. The rationale
behind  this  hypothesis  was  that  it appeared
that growers  had  a vested  interest in  voting
and, in fact, voting for a marketing order,  ac-
cording to the price analysis of Centner, Tur-
ner, and Bryan.  On the other hand,  those in-
volved in packing activities had less incentive
to vote or vote in the affirmative. The expected
impact of ACS on  VOTE1  and  VOTE2 was
uncertain.  Halligan found size of operation to
be associated with opposition to marketing or-
ders,  which  would  imply a negative  sign  for
the  specification  of this  study.  On  the other
hand,  as  acreage  devoted  to  Vidalia  onions
increased,  one could expect it to be in the pro-
ducer's interest to vote and to vote for passage
of the marketing order.
For the economic structure variable, PACK,
one would expect that the smaller the number
of packers in the producer's county, the more
likely growers would vote. A large number of
packers  implied competition,  and one  would
expect  a producer to be  less inclined  to vote
for the marketing order when competition for
onions  was  keen.  TOTGROW was  hypothe-
sized to have  a negative  influence  on voting
due to the attitude that one vote would have
less effect in a county with  a large number of
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Table 2.  Coefficient  Estimates for Probit Models  of Voting Decision
Estimates (t-values)
Probit
Model  1  Model 2
Variables  (VOTE1)a N  = 227  (VOTE2)b N= 112
.311426  .506032
Constant  (1.702)  (1.95)
ACS  -. 0001597824  -. 000328937
(Grower's acreage registered  to Vidalia onion production)  (-.089)  (-.118)
TYPE  -. 052811  .206926
(Type of grower: 0-grower,  1-grower/packer)  (-.297)  (.774)
TOTGROW  -. 0106265  .0197128
(Number of growers in county)  (-1.835)*  (2.215)**
PACK  .0087172  -. 0399901
(Number of packers in county)  (.884)  (-2.789)**
-2  x  log likelihood ratioc  7.1713  10.492**
Degrees of Freedom  4  4
*  Significant at  .1 level; **  Significant  at .05  level.
a Grower decision to vote: O-did not vote;  1-voted.
b Grower vote on  state marketing order:  O-voted against order; 1--voted for  order.
cThe null  hypothesis is that all parameter estimates except the constant equal zero  and the degrees of freedom  refer to this test.
growers.  On the other hand, the more growers
in a county, the greater the apparent benefit of
a marketing order, especially if promotion (ex-
panded demand) was an ingredient  of the or-
der. Thus, the hypothesized  positive relation-
ship between  TOTGRO W and voting "yes."
Hypothesizing appropriate  signs for the ex-
planatory variables in these voting models was
difficult.  Marketing  order  voting  behavior  is
influenced by many different factors including
perceptions,  psychology,  and industry  leader-
ship  as well  as other  socioeconomic  factors.
Furthermore, these types of  decisions have not
been  studied  much  in  the past.  By contrast,
directional hypotheses for pricing models,  for
example, are much easier to develop  because
past  analyses  show  much  more  predictable
patterns. The results  of the probit models are
shown in table 2.
Results
In general,  only the market structure variables
(PACK and TOTGROW) appeared  to be  sig-
nificant in either of the models. A surprising
result  was  the seemingly  irrelevant  influence
of the number of acres in onion production on
voting behavior. This was in contrast to Hal-
ligan's findings. Although TYPE exerted some
influence  on voter  behavior,  it was  far from
significant  in either model.
It appears the only explanatory factor tested
that  had  explanatory  power  in  explaining
whether  a grower  would  vote (model  1) was
TOTGROW.  Furthermore,  the negative  sign
of the parameter  estimate coincided  with the
hypothesis that the more growers in a county,
the less likely an individual grower would vote.
Holding  all  other  variables  constant  at their
sample means,  an increase  of one grower in a
county (TOTGRO Wincreased one unit) would
have the effect of decreasing the probability of
an individual  producer in that county voting
in the referendum by .4 of 1%. This result was
consistent with the perception  of the paradox
of not voting (since the chance of one's vote
making a difference is about zero, why trouble
to vote?) (Schwartz).  But the small number of
Vidalia  onion  growers  eligible  to vote was  a
countervailing factor to the paradox of  not vot-
ing. One individual vote comprised almost one-
half of a  percent  of the total  population  of
eligible voters. Furthermore,  model 1 was not
significant  at a  .10 level,  which implied  that
the decision  to participate  in the state  refer-
endum was random  (or at least not explained
by the included variables).
This would lead to model 2 which modeled
the decision  to vote  for or  against the refer-
endum and  was  significant  at a  .05  level.  In
model  2,  the  influence  of TOTGROW  and
PACKwas as hypothesized, and both were sig-
nificant at the .05 level. A one-unit increase in
Mixon, Turner, anad CentnerWestern Journal  ofAgricultural  Economics
Table 3.  Predictive Ability of Voting Behavior Models  versus  Actual Behavior
Actual
Model  1 (VOTE 1)a  Model  2 (VOTE2)b
Total  Total
Item  0  1  (Predicted)  0  1  (Predicted)
Predicted  0  52  32  84  18  14  32  0
1  63  80  143  22  58  80  1
Total (actual)  115  112  227C  40  72  112
Number of Correct Predicted  132  76
Percent of Correct Predicted  58  68
Pseudo R2 (Maddala)  .04  .12
a Grower decision to vote: O-did not vote;  1-voted.
b Grower vote on state  marketing order: O-voted against order;  1-voted for order.
c243  onion growers and grower/packers  were eligible to vote in the referendum.  Data for this analysis were available from 227 growers
and grower/packers.
TOTGRO W, with all other variables held con-
stant at their means, would have the effect of
increasing the probability of a producer voting
for the marketing  order by  .7 of 1%.  On  the
other hand,  a  one-unit increase  in PACK, at
other variables' sample means, would have the
effect  of decreasing  the probability  of a  pro-
ducer voting by 1%. The insignificance of mod-
el 1 (. 10 level) and significance of model 2 (.05
level)  lend  empirical  credibility  to using two
separate  probit  models  to explain  voter  be-
havior in this  state  marketing  order  referen-
dum.
Table 3 shows the predictive abilities of the
models. Model 1, which measured the grower's
decision to participate  in the marketing order
election, predicted  84 growers would not vote
and 143 would vote. The criterion for a correct
prediction  was that the individual  prediction
had to  be  correct.  For example,  in model  1
only  52  of the  115  nonvoters  and  80  of the
112 voters were correctly predicted. Thus, the
voting behavior of 132  out of 227 (58%)  in-
dividuals was correctly predicted using model
1. Model  1 had a pseudo R2 (Maddala) of.04.
Model 2 correctly predicted 58 out of 72 votes
for adoption of the order and 18 out of 40 votes
against adoption. Thus, model 2 had a correct
prediction rate of 68% and a pseudo R2 (Mad-
dala) of. 12.
Perhaps the most striking result of this anal-
ysis was the indicated irrelevance of individual
characteristics on the decision to vote and how
to vote. In both models, only economic struc-
ture  variables  were  significant  in  their  rela-
tionships  to the voting  decision.  It  appeared
that for individual voters, the surrounding so-
cial  and  economic  situations  were  the deter-
mining influences. It was in the context of these
networks, both social and economic, where the
voting decisions were made. It should be men-
tioned that the data base in this analysis  was
limited in that many socioeconomic variables,
such as age,  education levels,  organization  of
business,  annual  producer  marketings,  etc.,
were unavailable.  This was due, in large part,
to the lack of data for specialty crops in general
and producers in particular.
Implications
Results of the empirical analysis of the grow-
ers'  voting behavior showed that the number
of acres in sweet onion production for an in-
dividual grower did not have a significant  in-
fluence on whether a grower voted or how he/
she  voted.  Furthermore,  the  distinction  be-
tween  growers and grower-packers  was  not a
significant explanatory  factor on voter behav-
ior. Rather,  factors external to the individual
grower and related to economic  structure ap-
peared to exert a stronger influence on voting
behavior. These variables were the total num-
ber of growers  and the number of packers in
a county.  A grower was  less  likely to vote  if
there were  a large number of growers in his/
her county, but if the grower did vote, he/she
was more likely to vote for the marketing or-
der. As packers in a county increased, the like-
lihood of a grower voting  for the state  order
decreased.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these
results.  First,  apathy  seemed  to  be  a  major
factor in this  state  marketing order election.
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Only  17%  of the  total growers  voiced  oppo-
sition, but their position won. One could argue
that the structure of the voting rules made the
growers aware  that not voting was equivalent
to a "no" vote. This is almost paradoxical since
apparent voter apathy could in fact have been
strategic voting behavior.  Second, individual
characteristics appeared  to have little explan-
atory power  on the voting for this marketing
order, at least as shown by the models. On the
other hand,  economic structure  variables  ap-
peared to have  a stronger influence  on voter
behavior.  The  competitiveness  of  local  de-
mand, as measured by number of local  pack-
ers,  appeared to have a negative influence  on
support for a state marketing order. Large local
supply,  as measured  by  the number of local
growers, appeared to have a positive influence
on support  for a marketing order.
A specific implication of this analysis is that
much greater  grower  participation  would  be
necessary  for  the  implementation  of a  state
marketing order for Vidalia onions. Assuming
the 64% positive majority vote,  a voting rate
of 80% of all growers would be needed to gen-
erate the required  122 affirmative  votes. This
would be a major change from the actual 47%
voting rate.
As an alternative,  a federal marketing order
may be easier to approve via a referendum of
Vidalia  onion  producers.  Although  approval
of a federal order requires affirmation by two-
thirds of the growers or growers producing two-
thirds  of the  volume  of Vidalia  onions,  this
supermajority  is calculated  from  the growers
voting in the referendum  (U.S.  Code). Thus,
through the organization  and mobilization of
growers favorably disposed to a marketing or-
der, growers may achieve a supermajority vote
as nonvoters do not impact the vote. This oc-
curred  in  March  1989  when  Vidalia  onion
growers were  successful in approving a refer-
endum for an interim federal marketing order
where  144 out of 146 producers voted in favor
of the interim  order.
Specialty crop growers  should be able to ar-
ticulate the goals behind the impetus  for im-
plementing  a  marketing  order.  From  these
goals, an initial decision whether to pursue the
state or federal  marketing order can be made.
This is a crucial decision since ratification rules
and jurisdiction are different between the two.
The Vidalia onion referendum  examined here
is a good example. An argument could be built
for pursuing the state marketing order due to
the lower referendum requirements for passage
(51%  affirmative  vote for a state order versus
two-thirds  affirmative  for  a  federal  order).
However,  since nonvoters are not counted as
passive negative votes in a federal referendum,
it  might  be  easier  for producers  to  adopt  a
federal marketing order. In addition,  a federal
marketing order has greater jurisdiction which
could stimulate grower interest resulting in in-
creased voter participation and affirmative ac-
tion.
This study is relevant to growers of specialty
crops  for several  reasons.  The proponents  of
a marketing order should be aware of the rules
of ratification. Some state marketing order rat-
ification rules  make maximum voter  partici-
pation necessary. Even moderate levels of vot-
er apathy make ratification difficult.  It is clear
that to enact a marketing order sufficient pro-
ducer  interest  must be  generated.  Results  of
the Vidalia onion analysis  indicate four areas
of concentration  for proponents  of marketing
orders.
First, the probit analysis revealed that pro-
ducers in counties with a large number of  grow-
ers were more likely to vote for the marketing
order but they were also less likely to vote.  It
is not known if that pattern would be repeated
in other industries.  Nevertheless,  proponents
could develop strategies to increase voter par-
ticipation in areas with large numbers of grow-
ers.
Second, the analysis suggested that econom-
ic factors relating to supply and demand were
more influential than characteristics of  the vot-
er.  Again,  a caveat is in order when trying to
generalize  this result  to other industries.  But
this result is logical  since a marketing order is
an economic alternative that attempts to affect
both  consumer  and  producer  surplus  in the
short  run  (Berck  and  Perloff).  Strategies  that
educate  and inform voters regarding the eco-
nomic  consequences  of  a  marketing  order
would appear to be most effective.
Third, strategies that concentrate on increas-
ing voter participation in general would appear
to increase  the probability of enacting a mar-
keting order. In the Vidalia onion referendum,
lack of grower  participation  made passage of
the state marketing order impossible. Without
incentives for voting or penalties  for not vot-
ing, it would appear that passage of a Vidalia
onion state marketing order would be difficult.
Of course, economic education about the ben-
efits and costs of a marketing order would pre-
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sumably increase grower participation in most
marketing order referendums.
Fourth,  a strategy  for producers  may be to
seek a federal marketing order. Although a fed-
eral order requires a supermajority affirmative
vote  and  requisite  findings  by the  U.S.  Sec-
retary  of Agriculture,  only  those  voting  are
considered in calculating the affirmative vote.
Thus, as shown by the votes on state and fed-
eral  marketing  orders  for Vidalia  onions  in
Georgia, a concentrated effort by producers in
favor of a federal  order  may lead to a super-
majority  positive  vote facilitating  the imple-
mentation of an order.  Of course,  subsequent
required referenda could lead to the demise of
an order.
Grower referenda on marketing orders offer
unique opportunities  to explore the impact of
various factors on voting behavior. The results
presented here, indicating that growers' voting
behavior was influenced by their wallets, should
come as no  surprise.  Referenda  studies from
other  regions  and  crops  could  add  broader
knowledge  and perhaps validity to the results
of this study.
[Received March 1989; final revision
received September 1989.]
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